Organisational Learning And Multinational Strategy by Nooteboom, B. (Bart)
  
 
 
 
Organisational Learning And Multinational Strategy 
 
Bart Nooteboom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ERIM REPORT SERIES RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT 
ERIM Report Series reference number ERS-2004-004-ORG 
Publication  2004 
Number of pages 25 
Email address corresponding author bnooteboom@fbk.eur.nl 
Address Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) 
Rotterdam School of Management / Rotterdam School of Economics  
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 
P.O.Box 1738  
3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
Phone:  +31 10 408 1182   
Fax: +31 10 408 9640 
Email:  info@erim.eur.nl 
Internet:  www.erim.eur.nl 
 
Bibliographic data and classifications of all the ERIM reports are also available on the ERIM website:  
www.erim.eur.nl 
ERASMUS  RESEARCH  INSTITUTE  OF  MANAGEMENT 
 
REPORT SERIES 
RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA AND CLASSIFICATIONS 
Abstract Increasingly, it has been recognised that in their process of internationalisation multinationals 
may learn. They may take a strategy not only of exploitation, to leverage existing assets, 
competencies and products, built up in their home countries, but also, and perhaps even 
primarily, of exploration, to profit from diversity of host countries to develop new products and 
competencies. The question is how they can manage and integrate resulting diversity. This 
article analyses that issue, using a theory of organisational learning. It employs a ‘cycle of 
discovery’ that seeks to resolve the problem of combining exploitation and exploration. That 
problem arises more widely, apart from internationalisation, and solutions to it may yield 
solutions for problems of internationalisation. 
5001-6182 Business 
5546-5548.6 Office Organization and Management 
Library of Congress 
Classification  
(LCC) HD 2755.5  Multinational corporations 
M Business Administration and Business Economics  
M 10 
L 2 
Business Administration: general 
Firm Objectives, Organization and Behaviour 
Journal of Economic 
Literature  
(JEL) 
F 23  Multinational firms 
85 A Business General 
100B 
240 B 
Organization Theory (general) 
Information Systems Management 
European Business Schools 
Library Group  
(EBSLG) 
205 C Multinationals and their  environment 
Gemeenschappelijke Onderwerpsontsluiting (GOO) 
85.00 Bedrijfskunde, Organisatiekunde: algemeen 
85.05 
85.08 
Management organisatie: algemeen 
Organisatiesociologie, organisatiepsychologie 
Classification GOO 
85.10 Strategisch beleid 
Bedrijfskunde / Bedrijfseconomie 
Organisatieleer, informatietechnologie, prestatiebeoordeling 
Keywords GOO 
Globalisatie, multinationale ondernemingen, lerende organisatie, innovatie 
Free keywords globalization, international business, multinational corporations, organizational learning, 
innovation. 
 
 
ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING AND MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY 
 
 
Bart Nooteboom 
Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam 
bnooteboom@fbk.eur.nl 
 
 
 
Increasingly, it has been recognised that in their process of internationalisation multinationals may 
learn. They may take a strategy not only of exploitation, to leverage existing assets, competencies 
and products, built up in their home countries, but also, and perhaps even primarily, of exploration, 
to profit from diversity of host countries to develop new products and competencies. The question is 
how they can manage and integrate resulting diversity. This article analyses that issue, using a 
theory of organisational learning. It employs a ‘cycle of discovery’ that seeks to resolve the problem 
of combining exploitation and exploration. That problem arises more widely, apart from 
internationalisation, and solutions to it may yield solutions for problems of internationalisation. 
 
Key words: globalization, international business, multinational corporations, organizational 
learning, innovation. 
 
Areas of study: strategy, international business, organization, alliances 
 1
 ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING AND MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY 
 
 
Increasingly, it has been recognised that in their process of internationalisation multinationals may 
learn. They may take a strategy not only of exploitation, to leverage existing assets, competencies 
and products, built up in their home countries, but also, and perhaps even primarily, of exploration, 
to profit from diversity of host countries to develop new products and competencies. The question is 
how they can manage and integrate resulting diversity. This article analyses that issue, using a 
theory of organisational learning. It employs a ‘cycle of discovery’ that seeks to resolve the problem 
of combining exploitation and exploration. That problem arises more widely, apart from 
internationalisation, and solutions to it may yield solutions for problems of internationalisation. 
 2
INTRODUCTION 
 
In processes of internationalisation, there are differences between organisations as well as 
differences between national institutional systems. The literature on business systems has 
highlighted the importance of national institutional systems for the functioning and the performance 
of businesses (e.g. Whitley 1998, 1999, Hollingsworth & Boyer 1997, Lane 1997, Hollingsworth, 
Schmitter & Streeck 1994). In MNC operations, we encounter on the one hand the effect of home 
country institutions and practices that have contributed to the shaping of MNC routines (the ‘home 
country effect’), and on the other hand the effect of host country institutions on the functioning of 
subsidiaries (the ‘host country effect’) (Lane 1997). A challenge is to find out how home country 
and host country effects are combined. In one extreme, an MNC is able to impose its institutional 
arrangements on the host country, and thereby either circumvent obstacles from host country 
institutions, or transform those institutions in order to eliminate obstacles (‘imposition’). In another 
extreme, a subsidiary adapts its routines to fit host country institutions (‘adaptation’). In practice 
there will mostly be some combination of imposition and adaptation. Where the emphasis lies, on 
imposition or adaptation, depends, among other things, on the power or the ‘clout’ that the MNC 
has, in terms of what it can offer to the host country, and its access to local political power. The 
value of its offer to the host country may lie in the size of direct investment, employment, 
technological capability, managerial and organisational capability, and access to global markets in 
marketing, through brand name and distribution systems (Child 1998). At first sight, it may seem 
the most advantageous for the MNC to follow a strategy of imposition as much as it can, given its 
clout. 
However, on the basis of a theory of discovery (Nooteboom 2000), it is argued in this article 
that in the longer run a deliberate policy of adaptation may be more advantageous, along a path of 
learning and discovery. Adaptation has implications for the way in which the subsidiary employs 
local resources of labour, skills, knowledge, organisation, education, culture, consumer tastes and 
practices, infrastructure, in other words forms of intellectual, political and social capital. In 
particular, it has implications for whether the MNC sets up its own establishments (‘greenfield 
investment’), takes over local companies (‘brownfield investment’), or, on the contrary, engages in 
more or less balanced alliances (such as, for example, joint ventures) with local organisations. 
Often, for learning the latter is the best, since it taps into variety of local conditions as a source of 
innovation. In a study of joint ventures between foreign and Chinese companies in China, Child 
(1998) found the contrasting strategies of imposition and local adaptation, and recognised that in the 
long run the latter might be more productive.  
In a survey of literature on learning in multinationals, Macharzina et. al. (2001: 643) 
proposed that there are two basic modes of internationalisation. One is a ‘center-oriented’ mode of 
‘global rationalisation’, where ‘Subsidiaries are linked to each other on an operational level, but 
core competencies and the specialised knowledge for managing the entire system remain 
concentrated at the headquarters’. This is contrasted with ‘network-oriented modes’, which employ 
a ‘heterarchy’ of ‘many centers that are coordinated in various ways’, designed to ‘promote 
opportunities for acquiring knowledge provided by an established network of subsidiaries’ (op. cit. 
p. 644-645). The idea that there may be advantages of learning in international operations was 
already recognised by Vernon (1979). The question is how this is to be realised. Bartlett & Ghoshal 
(1989: 62) proposed that an organisation is needed that is neither centralised nor dispersed, where 
‘In some markets, national subsidiaries adopt standard global products, and their role is limited to 
effective and efficient implementation of central decisions. Other subsidiaries are encouraged to 
differentiate. … In such cases headquarters relinquishes its lead role to the subsidiary’. However, a 
central problem then is how to ‘cope with the conflicting challenges of maintaining internal 
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efficiency and allowing for organisational responsiveness to diverse local conditions’ (Bartlett 
1986, quoted in Macharzina et. al. 2001: 644). Bartlett & Ghoshal (1989: 67) proposed that the 
management task is to provide ‘legitimation of diverse perspectives and capabilities’ (for the sake 
of global competitiveness) with ‘building a shared vision and individual commitment’ (called ‘co-
option’, for the sake of integrated, worldwide learning). Here, ‘.. each individual must understand 
and share the company’s purposes and values, must identify with the broader goals and objectives, 
and must accept and internalise its key strategies’ (op. cit. p. 70). It is far from clear how this is to 
be done. How do the ‘broader goals and objectives’ and ‘key strategies’ come about?  Are we back 
at the ‘center-oriented mode’? If not, how would the variety generated in subsidiaries lead to a 
reconstruction of goals, objectives and strategies? Macharzina et. al. ended their survey with the 
comment that the ‘sub disciplines of international management that deal with organisational 
learning and knowledge have contributed an immense number of descriptive statements but only a 
small number of explanatory ones (which are) isolated from each other’, and ‘the most important 
research task ahead is to develop an integrative theoretical framework’. That challenge is taken up 
in this article.   
There is a more general problem of combining efficient exploitation of existing resources 
(including competencies) with exploration, in the development of new resources, which is known, 
in the organisational literature, as the problem of combining exploitation and exploration (March 
1991).1 The working hypothesis of this article is that insights in how to combine exploitation and 
exploration may yield solutions for the organisational problem of MNC’s.     
This article proceeds as follows. First, it makes some introductory observations on 
institutions and organisations. Second, it summarises the theory of knowledge used, and the 
implications for a ‘cognitive theory of the firm’. Third, it summarises the theory of learning and 
discovery used, in a ‘heuristic of discovery’. Fourth, it develops an argument of how this may yield 
a learning strategy for MNC’s, to yield organisational learning by adaptation to host country 
institutions.  
 
INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANISATIONS 
 
Some scholars (e.g. Williamson) maintain that organisations are institutions, while others (e.g. 
North 1990) maintain that organisations are players in a field of institutions. North and Thomas 
(1973) proposed a distinction between the ‘institutional environment’ and the ‘institutional 
arrangements’ of organisations within it. Rather than giving an ontological definition of institutions, 
in a universally applicable list of institutional entities, here we use a functional one, on the basis of 
what institutions do. Building on the work of many others, we characterise institutions as follows: 
Institutions both constrain and enable action (1), they are the (cumulative) result of earlier actions 
(2), are relatively stable, compared to the actions they enable (3) and are more or less binding, i.e. it 
is difficult to dodge or violate them without losing legitimation and acceptance. Here, we make use 
of Archer’s (1995) criticism of Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory, which neglects the effect of 
time. Structure develops as a resultant of actions, but those are mostly past actions, and in the 
present they cannot instantly be dodged or changed. 
An organisation is subject to institutional influences outside it, and it is also itself an 
institution regarding the actions within the organisation. Within the firm, a team or ‘community of 
                                                 
1 The notion of exploitation and exploration goes back to Holland (1975), who identified it in the 
context of cognitive science. 
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practice’ (Brown & Duguid 1996) is subject to organisational institutions and is itself an 
institutional arrangement for the workers in the team. As we go ‘down’ from more general to more 
specific institutions, there is increasing specialisation. While organisations are subject to the same 
wider institutions, they differ among each other, in their institutional arrangements. On different 
levels, institutions apply to different ranges of action. For national institutions it is the country, for 
industry institutions the industry (which increasingly crosses national boundaries), for 
organisational institutions it is the actions within it. Those ranges overlap. For example, a firm is 
faced with both national and industry institutions. An important point now is that the larger the 
range of an institution the more it will be subject to conservatism or ‘inertia’. When a local practice 
requires a change of an institution, this will have more repercussions to the extent that change 
would affect other activities, and force them to adapt to institutional change. Thus, higher-level 
institutions will change more slowly than lower level ones. Such resistance to change yields an 
incentive to disintegrate, uncouple or unbundle systems, to yield more allowance for local variety, 
with different institutional arrangements. That yields one argument why economic systems need to 
be cut up into different organisations.  
How do higher level institutions change, in their interaction, or ‘co-evolution’, with the 
lower level activities that fall in their range?2 Does change come ‘from above’? Structure forms the 
basis for agency, but also changes under the impact of agency. How does this work? There is still a 
bias, in the business literature, that change is designed from above, by top management, at a head 
office. This is reflected, in the earlier discussion, in the suggestion by Bartlett & Ghoshal (1989) 
that ‘overarching goals, objectives and strategies’ are somehow given, and that everyone has to 
conform to them. How would top management know what they should be? How would 
management know what can be done, if insights into possibilities arise from experience ‘below’, at 
interfaces with customers, suppliers, and competitors? This question has become more pressing 
under current conditions of rapid change, in technology and markets, increased complexity and 
depth of knowledge, and the professionalisation of work, which make it more difficult for 
management to monitor and absorb what goes on and how that may be changed. Perhaps, especially 
under these conditions, we should see change as primarily coming from below, in ‘self-
organisation’. Change of lower level institutions induces change of higher level ones, when success 
of lower level change forces higher level institutions to accommodate their structure to enable 
emerging success to realise its full potential. At the higher level, the task is not so much the design 
of structure as the allowance and enabling of structural development to take place. Perhaps the task 
is not the specification of  ‘overarching goals, objectives and strategies’ but the cultivation of basic 
cultural values and perceptions concerning processes of change and conflict resolution that enable 
and constrain the adaptation of strategies and objectives.  
In institutional economics, notably in the work of North (1990), a distinction is made 
between formal and informal institutions. Our interpretation of formal institutions is that they are 
(1) codified and (2) backed up by explicit sanctions. Rules are subject to interpretation. This raises 
questions of cognition. In more recent work (e.g. the work of North) institutions are seen to have a 
not only a regulative (constraining, enabling) but also a cognitive aspect. To deal with issues of 
                                                 
2 It seems that the fashionable term ‘co-evolution’ has expanded to cover any parallel change of 
entities that mutually influence each other. Then, everything becomes co-evolution. Then one 
would, for example, co-evolve with one’s pet dog. The term co-evolution comes from evolutionary 
theory, where it denotes the change of a selection environment as a result of activities selected by it. 
In terms of the ‘structure-agency’ problem, it denotes structuration, i.e. how agency affects the 
structure (institutional set-up) that constrains and enables it.  
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cognition in general, and with the relation between regulative and cognitive institutions in 
particular, we need a theory of knowledge. 
 
A COGNITIVE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONS 
 
For knowledge, this article employs a social constructivist, interactionist view, inspired by the 
symbolic interactionism of Mead (1934), and by a stream of cognitive science that is coming to be 
known as ‘embodied cognition’ (Damasio 1995, Edelman 1987, 1992, Lakoff & Johnson 1999). A 
similar move was proposed by Macharzina et. al. (2001: 649). The term ‘knowledge’ here is a broad 
one, including perception, understanding, value judgements, and even emotions. People perceive, 
interpret and evaluate the world according to mental categories (or frames or mental models) that 
they develop in interaction with their physical, social/institutional environment. This entails that 
perception, interpretation and evaluation are contingent upon the institutional environment. Thus, 
people are influenced in their thinking by prevailing norms. The constructivist, interactionist view 
also implies that to some extent knowledge, in the broad sense, is path-dependent and idiosyncratic. 
Different people see the world differently to the extent that they have developed in different social 
and physical surroundings and have not interacted with each other. In other words, environment and 
past experience determine ‘absorptive capacity’ (Cohen & Levinthal 1990). Understanding of 
codified knowledge requires a requisite substrate of tacit knowledge to assimilate the codified 
knowledge. In this assimilation, receivers are not just receivers but also producers of knowledge. 
Therefore, any boundary between learning and knowledge transfer is problematic. Who can absorb 
the knowledge depends on the extent and the way in which it is codified. Thus, codification is 
always to a greater or lesser extent exclusionary: it excludes those who do not have the requisite 
absorptive capacity. As a result, there is not only power in knowledge in the sense that it gives 
advantage to those who have it. There is power also in establishing the extent and the way, i.e. the 
code, by which knowledge is codified, because that determines who can absorb it.  
As proposed by Nooteboom (1992), an implication of this view of knowledge for the theory 
of the firm is that in order to achieve a specific joint goal the categories of thought of the people 
involved must be aligned to some extent. Different people have a greater or lesser ‘cognitive 
distance’ between them. In view of this, organisations need to reduce cognitive distance, i.e. 
achieve a sufficient alignment of mental frames, to understand each other, utilise complementary 
capabilities, achieve a common goal and have trust. This yields the notion of organisation as a 
‘focusing device’, to reduce cognitive distance, to achieve a sufficient alignment of mental 
categories, to understand each other, utilise complementary capabilities and achieve a common 
goal. To achieve this, organisations develop their own specialised semiotic systems, in language, 
symbols, metaphors, myths, and rituals. This is what we call organisational culture. This differs 
between organisations to the extent that they carry different imprints from early entrepreneurs, and 
have accumulated different experiences, in different industries, technologies and markets. This view 
of a firm is not new. It connects with the idea, in the organisation literature, that the crux of an 
organisation is to serve as a ‘sensemaking system’ (Weick 1979, 1995), a ‘system of shared 
meaning’ (Smircich 1983) or ‘interpretation system’ (Choo 1998). This yields a more fundamental 
reason for firms to exist than the reduction of transaction costs, although transaction costs are also 
part of the story.  
Note that alignment of cognitive frames in the firm need not entail full identity. As 
discussed in Nooteboom (1999) there is a trade-off between cognitive distance, needed for variety 
and novelty of cognition, and cognitive proximity, needed for mutual understanding. In fact, 
different people in a firm will to a greater or lesser extent introduce elements of novelty from their 
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outside lives and experience, and this is a source of both innovation and error, of both learning and 
conflict.  
Organisational focus needs to be tight, in the sense of allowing for little ambiguity and 
variety of meanings and standards, if the productive system of a firm, for the sake of exploitation, is 
‘systemic’, as opposed to ‘stand–alone’ (Langlois & Robertson, 1995). Exploitation is systemic 
when there is a complex division of labor, with many elements and a dense structure of relations 
between them, with tight constraints on their interfaces. An example is an oil refinery. In more 
stand-alone systems, elements of the system are connected with few other elements, and 
connections are loose, allowing for some ambiguity and deviation from standards on interfaces. An 
example is a consultancy firm. An intermediate system, between systemic and stand-alone, is a 
modular system. Here, there are also multiple, connected elements, as in the systemic case, but the 
standards on interfaces allow for variety, where different modules can be plugged into the system. 
Schein (1985) proposed that in organisational culture there are several levels. There is a 
surface structure of routines, rituals, symbols, myths, and the like, an intermediate structure of 
norms and values, and a deep structure of fundamental, underlying ‘assumptions’ or mental 
categories. The latter relate to questions such as the following. Is knowledge objective or subjective 
(socially constructed), do people stand alone or are they socially embedded, does one control one’s 
environment or is one controlled by it (‘locus of control’), are people basically good or evil, prone 
to collaboration or competition, oriented towards a common good or self-interest, and the like. 
These basic perspectives are embedded in language and metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson 1980), and 
constructed and reconstructed in communicative action (Habermas 1982, 1984).  
Likewise, wider institutional environments, in business systems, also differ not only in 
‘surface’ institutions, such as regulatory, legal, financial and educational systems, professional 
bodies, employers’ organisations, unions, and the like, but also, and more fundamentally, in 
underlying cultural categories and tacit views and assumptions concerning the world, people, 
collaboration, and the like. To the extent that firms have developed in a distinctive, shared national 
institutional environment, they will share its cognitive imprint. Here, one can think of well-known 
cultural categories as proposed by (Hofstede 1991): individualism versus collectivism, uncertainty 
avoidance, femininity vs. masculinity, and power distance. 
We suspect that, whatever the merit of these categories, there is at least one other, 
concerning the nature of rules, laws and regulations. Those vary in scope, i.e. the range of activities 
they intend to cover, and depth, i.e. the detail in which they are specified. More fundamentally, they 
vary in their claim of universality and closure or completeness. Do they claim to cover all 
contingencies, or do they recognise that specific contexts are so rich, unpredictable and variable that 
canonical rules can never cover them completely, and that there is an irreducible ambiguity of 
context. The latter condition is recognised in the literature on ‘communities of practice’ (Brown & 
Duguid 1996, Lave & Wenger 1991, Wenger & Snyder 2000). Canonical rules cannot deal with the 
complexity and variability of situated action, in specific action contexts. This is related to a deep 
problem in the theory of meaning. Since definitions can seldom offer necessary and sufficient 
conditions for categorisation, and meaning is context-dependent and open-ended, allowing for 
variation and change, we need prototypes (Rosch 1978). Prototypes are salient exemplars of a class 
that guide categorisation by assessing similarity to the prototype. This, we suggest, goes back to 
Aristotle’s notion of ‘mimesis’. From this follows the role, in organisation, of leaders setting 
exemplars or prototypes of conduct, embodied in myths and stories of ‘heroes’ that do not specify 
conduct and yet guide it. This issue is also reflected in legal systems. Do they pretend to explicitly 
cover all that is forbidden, or is conduct also assessed in terms of  reasonableness in the light of 
established practice, in jurisdiction on the basis of cases that serve as prototypes. Are rules interpreted 
loosely, with regard for exceptions according to specific conditions, or are they applied strictly and 
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rigorously? There seems to be a difference here between, for example, the US, where ethics and rules 
carry a more universal pretension, and are applied strictly, and the Netherlands, where there is more 
tolerance of deviance, and rules are applied more loosely.  
Organisational focus, based on organisational culture, carries the imprint of national culture, 
but can deviate from it, to a greater or lesser extent, to allow for foreign influence.  
For an elaboration of the content of organisational focus, on the surface level, use can be made of 
Mintzberg’s (1983) distinction between five forms of coordination in organisations: Direct 
supervision, standardisation of processes, outputs or skills, and mutual adaptation. Later, Mintzberg 
added coordination by values/norms, for ‘missionary organisations’ (such as a church). The focus 
can be directed at one or more of these forms of coordination. When processes are standardized, as 
in an assembly line, workers need to understand instructions, but may not need to be able to talk to 
each other. In professional organisations, where processes and outputs are difficult to standardize 
and monitor, one often resorts to standardisation of skills. When that is problematic, or insufficient, 
one may have to resort to mutual adjustment. Here, people need to share certain values and norms 
for doing that. In the development of economies that are more service oriented and more based on 
professional work, there has been a shift towards coordination by standardisation of skills, mutual 
adaptation and ‘missionary’ goals, values and norms. One interpretation of entrepreneurship, which 
links with Schumpeter’s (and Weber’s) notion of the entrepreneur as a charismatic figure, is that it 
is his central task to achieve this: to align perceptions, understandings and motives. This connects 
with the earlier discussion of the task of management in goal setting. This perspective may be 
useful to further ‘fill in’ Bartlett & Ghoshal’s proposal that there may be mixed modes of 
coordination in relations between a multinational’s head-office and subsidiaries.  
When there are technical opportunities and competitive pressures to utilise economy of scale 
by division of labour, one may need to coordinate by standardisation of tasks and skills. This may 
typically be the case in manufacturing activities. When the system of exploiting current resources is 
highly systemic, one may need to coordinate by standardisation of outputs, to preserve systemic 
integrity, and when the system is more stand-alone one may relax such standards. The former may 
apply more to manufacturing and the latter to consultancy, for example. In professional 
organisations (such as consultancy) one may resort only to some standardisation of skills. When 
there are opportunities for learning, and competitive pressures for innovation, in the development of 
new production technologies, products and skills, one may need to relax all standards and resort to a 
more missionary type of organisation, where one only specifies basic, underlying values and 
cultural perspectives, not in the forms of specified rules of conduct, but in the form of exemplary, 
prototypical conduct, to be emulated by mimesis, as indicated before. In a mix of activities, one 
may, in principle, employ a mix of coordination mechanisms, but that may so dilute and expand 
organisational scope as to yield a loss of organisational identity. Then, the question is whether it 
would not be better to disintegrate, and to seek flexible configurations of autonomous organisational 
units with different scopes. In other words, one should seek a cognitive division of labour.     
 
COGNITIVE DIVISION OF LABOUR 
 
A second implication of the theory of knowledge for the theory of the firm is that as a result of the 
need to achieve a focus there is a risk of myopia: relevant threats and opportunities to the firm are 
not perceived. To compensate for this, people, and firms, need complementary sources of outside 
intelligence, to utilise ‘external economy of cognitive scope’ (Nooteboom 1992). Here again the 
trade-off arises between cognitive distance, for the sake of novelty, and cognitive proximity, for the 
sake of understanding. A large cognitive distance has the merit of novelty but the problem of 
incomprehensibility. Effectiveness of learning by interaction can be construed as the product of the 
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two, which yields an inverted U-shaped relationship, with an optimal cognitive distance. However, 
one can increase absorptive and communicative capacity to deal with larger cognitive distance.  
For a direct test of the hypothesis of optimal cognitive distance one would need data that 
include both a measure of cognitive distance and a measure of radical innovative output. Wuyts et. 
al. (2003) conducted two more indirect tests. The first test was conducted on a combination of the 
basic hypothesis of optimal cognitive distance with a second hypothesis that cognitive distance 
decreases with increased frequency and duration of interaction. This yields the derived hypothesis 
of an inverted U-shaped relation between radical technological innovation and the extent to which 
firms ally with the same partners over time. That hypothesis was tested on data on vertical alliances 
between biotech and pharma companies, and was supported. The second test was conducted on a 
combination of the basic hypothesis of optimal cognitive distance with a second hypothesis that the 
likelihood of a collaborative alliance increases with the expected performance of collaborative 
innovation. This yielded the derived hypothesis that the likelihood of an alliance for innovation has 
an inverted U-shaped relation with cognitive distance. That hypothesis was tested on data on 
alliances in ICT industries. Cognitive distance was measured by differences in degrees of 
specialization in different dimensions of technology, inferred from patent data. Partial support was 
found.  
The argument of optimal cognitive distance has implications for the choice between 
integration by mergers/acquisitions (MA) and inter-firm alliances (Nooteboom 1999). First, the 
notion of organisational focus, with its deep structure of underlying cognitive categories, 
accentuates the problems involved in integration. The problems involved in aligning systems of 
rewards, careers, organisational structure, reporting procedures, decision making procedures, etc. 
are large enough, but the far more difficult problem lies in aligning the underlying values and 
perspectives indicated by Schein. Those are part of the nexus of personal and organisational identity 
that are highly tacit, and thereby taken for granted, emotion-laden and embedded in absorptive 
capacity. Second, the notion of cognitive distance and cognitive division of labour indicates that 
such distance has value and needs to be preserved by keeping some distance, and keeping sources 
of complementary cognition fresh, on the basis of experience in different markets and technologies. 
Integration would not only reduce flexibility of configuration, but would also lead to a reduction of 
the cognitive distance that is the source of learning.  
A tenaciously held assumption in the literature on internationalisation is that cognitive 
distance is a problem to be overcome, and is not seen also as an opportunity to be taken. When 
learning is discussed, in the literature on international business, it is mostly discussed as learning to 
cope with transnational differences, by accumulating experience in cross-border collaboration (e.g. 
Barkema et. al. 1997), rather than taking those differences as a potential source of learning to 
change home country products or practices.  The possible positive effect of some cultural difference 
has not, to my knowledge, been included in studies of international management. According to the 
logic set out above, cross-cultural enterprise harbours both an opportunity to learn and a problem of 
lack of understanding. Here also, one might expect an inverted-U relationship between innovative 
performance and cultural distance, depending on ability to understand and empathise with foreign 
cultures, which in turn depends on cross-cultural experience. Here, the aim is not to reduce 
cognitive distance but to preserve it and to learn how to cross it. 
Johanson & Vahlne (1977, 1990) employed the notion of ‘psychological distance’, which is 
seen as having an adverse effect on cross-cultural communication. In an empirical study of foreign 
acquisitions in the UK, Child et. al. (2001) found that large cultural difference has a negative effect 
on success. Fey & Beamish (2001) found a similar negative effect on the performance of 
international joint ventures in Russia. However, in both studies no allowance was made for a 
quadratic, inverted U-shaped effect, and performance measurement was not focused on innovative 
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performance. In contrast, in a study of effects of cultural diversity on performance in Sino-Japanese 
and Sino-West joint ventures, Li et. al. (2002) allowed for a quadratic effect, and found a significant 
negative coefficient for the quadratic term, confirming an inverted U-shaped effect, for both sales 
per employee and ROA as measures of performance. 
A related assumption, in the literature on international business, is that the longer a relation 
lasts, the better it will perform. For example, in an empirical study of foreign-Chinese international 
joint ventures (IJV’s) in China, Child & Yan (2001: 7) posited the hypothesis that ‘The longer the 
time that an IJV has been in operation, the higher will be its level of performance’. In contrast, the 
implication of the present analysis is that there will be diminishing returns, followed by a negative 
effect of IJV duration on innovative performance. 
Of course, in cross-border collaboration there are not only problems of cultural difference, 
but also of differences in institutional and economic infrastructure that condition the success or 
failure of collaboration, in particular collaboration between companies from developed and under-
developed nations. This includes legal and regulatory regimes, capital markets, educational systems, 
physical infrastructure of transport and communication, and the like. The greater such differences, 
the more adaptation needs to take place, from the host country to home country practices, or vice 
versa. Such effects have to be controlled for, and here it is useful, again, to employ the distinction 
between differences in institutional environment and firm-level differences (institutional 
arrangements). The greater differences are in institutional environment, the more one needs local 
partners that are familiar with local conditions and are able to cope with them, and the more urgent 
it is to utilise such cognitive complementarity.  
 
INNOVATION 
 
For a further understanding of innovation and learning in processes of internationalisation, we need 
an understanding of innovation processes. In the organisational and economic literatures there is a 
stream of thought that suggests that innovation proceeds according to a ‘cycle’ with two stages. An 
initial stage of volatility, with the creation of Schumpeterian ‘novel combinations’, and a later stage 
of consolidation, with ‘dominant designs’ (Abernathy 1978, Abernathy & Utterback 1978, 
Abernathy & Clark 1985) and efficient production systems that employ economies of scale and 
experience. The cycle is generally held to imply a shift from product to process innovations, as 
product forms settle down and competitive pressure shifts to efficient production. The life cycle 
theory of innovation has been complemented with the product life cycle theory of internationalisation 
(Vernon 1966). According to this theory, the consolidated innovation, which originated in countries 
with advanced technology and demand, is ‘generalised’, i.e. carried to less developed countries with 
lower wages, in order to further extend the market and fight the competition by a further decrease of 
costs. 
 The life cycle theory of innovation suggests that the first, volatile stage of novel 
combinations requires decentralised, disintegrated organisational forms such as industrial districts 
of small, independent firms (Piore & Sabel 1983), or firms with a decentralised ‘organic’ structure, 
while the stage of consolidation requires a more integrated, bureaucratic structure. In other words: 
the degree of organisational integration depends on the stage in the innovation cycle. This connects 
with a long tradition in the organisational literature to propose that stable, predictable environments 
require integrated, ‘mechanistic’, bureaucratic forms of organisation, while volatile, varied and 
unpredictable environments require disintegrated, ‘organic’ forms of organisation (e.g. Burns & 
Stalker 1961, Chandler 1962, Emery & Trist 1965, Thompson 1967, Lawrence & Lorsch 1967). 
The cycle theory of innovation has met with empirical contradictions. Among other things, often 
process innovation precedes rather than follows product innovation. But a more fundamental 
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objection is that this cycle is not really a cycle. A genuine cycle leads back to the beginning. 
However, the origins of novelty remain a mystery, and that is precisely what we would like to 
understand. How does the discovery process work?  
A distinction has been made between ‘competency enhancing’ versus ‘competency 
destroying’ innovations (Abernathy & Clark 1985). Tushman and Anderson (1986) presented 
evidence of ‘technological discontinuities’ in the US cement, airline and minicomputer industries. 
This has led to the notion of  ‘punctuated equilibria’, with relatively fast breakthroughs after long 
periods of relative stability (Gersick 1991). Technology is presented as subject to ‘technology 
cycles’, with technological discontinuities that yield an ‘era of ferment’, in which novel designs are 
developed and existing practices are replaced, which leads to a dominant design, followed by an 
‘era of incremental change’ with an ‘elaboration of the dominant design’, which then leads on again 
to technological discontinuity. The first part is in accordance with the earlier ‘innovation cycle’. 
The second part is new, but no explanation is given of how incremental change leads up to 
technological discontinuity. An attempt to give such explanation was made by Nooteboom (2000), 
in a ‘heuristic of discovery’.  
 
A HEURISTIC OF DISCOVERY 
 
Nooteboom (2000) proposed that like crime discovery requires motive, opportunity and means. One 
needs an accumulation of unsatisfactory performance to generate motive, to overcome one’s own 
inertia or that of others, in an organisation or wider institutional setting. One needs opportunity to 
deviate from the sway of existing institutions. And one needs means in the form of insights into where 
and in what directions to look for change, what novel elements to obtain from what source, and how 
to incorporate them in present competency. One can obtain such conditions mostly by moving one’s 
present competencies across a variety of contexts (‘generalisation’), subjecting them to new 
challenges, adapting them to local conditions (‘differentiation’), interacting with others in the novel 
context, adopting elements of novelty from them (‘reciprocation’ or hybridisation). That is how we 
obtain motive, opportunity and means for change.  
One may need to escape to an outside niche, in ‘generalisation’, because one is, justly, not 
allowed to destroy the systemic integrity of established practice. That would yield pervasive 
repercussions of change, without insight in whether that would be feasible and worthwhile. Next to 
this economic argument for the protection of systemic structures, there are pressures of a social-
psychological nature. After innovation has settled down into a ‘dominant design’, there are strong 
pressures to conform to it. There are psychological pressures to be an insider in dominant groups, 
and social pressures to acquire legitimation. Dimaggio & Powell (1983) argued that apart from 
effects of evolutionary selection of the most successful practice, there are pressures towards 
‘organisational isomorphism’, by mimesis of established practice and conformance to norms, 
established by professional organisations, suppliers, customers, competitors, and regulatory 
agencies, in an ‘organisational field’. An example of such herd behaviour, or bandwagon effect, is 
the drive to engage in mergers and acquisitions, in spite of the fact that it is well known that they 
fail more often than they succeed. From the perspective of the present article one might add that to 
the extent that the economic system is closed to new entry, and the pace of innovation subsides, 
ongoing interaction between firms yields reduced cognitive distance: firms start to think alike. Such 
organisational isomorphism contributes to the permanence of distinctive features of business 
systems.   
To escape from all these forces of conformism one may need to take refuge in an outside 
niche, where there is less threat to the integrity of existing systems, to gain opportunity to be 
different. This is consonant with the fact, in the history of technology, that initially innovations are 
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developed not in areas where they could achieve their full potential, but in areas where they could be 
tolerated.  A familiar manifestation of this is the ‘spin-off’ of entrepreneurial ventures from long 
established firms. Another, so we propose in this article, is the move into a foreign country.  
 In the novel context (application, market, institutional environment), one runs into 
limitations of existing practices (processes, products). This generates motive for change, which at 
first is sought in proximate change, with minor adaptations, in ‘differentiation’, to maintain 
exploitation as much as possible. Next, if this does not suffice, the motive arises for more drastic 
change. Meanwhile, one has gained insight into similar or related processes or practices in the novel 
niche, which are seen to perform better in respects in which one’s established practice seems to fail. 
This leads to ‘reciprocation’, where one builds in elements from such local practice into one’s own, 
or tries to adopt local practice while maintaining elements from one’s own. A famous example of 
reciprocation is how Henry Ford’s idea of an assembly line in car manufacturing was inspired by 
the procedure, at a mail-order company, in which boxes on a conveyor belt passes successive 
stations, to be filled according to order slips. 
 Syncretic add-ons of outside elements, in reciprocation, labor under one or more of the 
following problems. Complexity of ad-hoc add-ons increases architectural complexity (‘spaghetti’), 
which yields problems of co-ordination and decreasing returns from further add-ons. Duplication of 
parts in different places of the architecture foregoes opportunities for economy of scale. More 
important, for the next step in the process, is the condition that the potential of novel elements is 
constrained by the architecture of the system in which they need to fit. Such structure may be the 
architecture of the practice itself, or structures of use, or super ordinate structures of distribution 
channels, legal acceptance, vested interests etc. Thereby, as success of novelty emerges in the niche, 
pressures arise for more radical architectural innovation (Henderson & Clark 1990), to allow the 
novelty to fully realise its potential. Such architectural change is not random: one indication for it is 
to design architecture such that novel elements that were proven useful in the preceding stage of 
reciprocation can better realise their potential. Here the niche that served for the incubation of 
novelty is expanded, and novelty creates its own new selection environment and corresponding 
institutions. Such more radical architectural innovation, on different levels of structure, creates 
confusion, creative destruction and a great deal of uncertainty. Here we are back at the beginning of 
the cycle: a process of consolidation is needed. Completion of the cycle explains, among other 
things, that while process innovation may follow product innovation, the reverse can equally be the 
case. 
This cycle of discovery yields an elaboration of the process of change ‘from below’, 
indicated earlier. It is related to the learning cycle of Kolb (1984), in an ‘activity theory’ of 
learning: learning (exploration) emerges from practice (exploitation). On a deeper level of analysis, 
this is consistent with the emerging stream of ‘embodied cognition’, mentioned before. In Kolb’s 
cycle, learning comes about from ‘concrete experience’, ‘reflective observation’, ‘abstract 
conceptualization and ‘active experimentation’. The present cycle of discovery gives more detail of 
what stages of development entail, and how they lead on to each other. The present cycle is also 
similar, up to appoint, to the ‘technology cycles’ proposed by Tushman, Romanelli and Gersick, 
discussed before. In particular, it shares the basic principle that the discovery process arises from an 
alternation of variety of form and variety of context: variety of form is reduced (in dominant designs) 
and replaced with variety of context (outside niches) that generates novel variety of form (innovation). 
The added value of the present heuristic of discovery is that it specifies by what process and steps 
‘discontinuity’ and punctuated equilibria come about.     
Interestingly, the idea of ‘escape’ to an outside niche, in generalisation, links with the notion 
of ‘allopatric speciation’ in evolutionary theory, as an explanation of punctuated equilibria in 
biology (Eldredge & Gould 1972). New species often arise outside, or at the periphery, of the parent 
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niche. After a lengthy process of outside experimentation, a breakthrough, including invasion into 
the parent niche, can occur relatively fast, yielding ‘punctuated equilibria’. In business systems, the 
relative slowness of prior development can be understood from the need to go through the 
developmental stages of generalisation, differentiation and reciprocation, discussed above.  
 Note that the cycle is proposed as a heuristic, i.e. a rule that generally tends to contribute to 
the goal of maintaining exploitation as much as possible while conducting exploration. It is not 
proposed as an inexorable march of logic that is necessary, uniform and universal. It is not 
necessary: innovation can occur on the basis of purely random trial and error, as suggested in 
evolutionary theories of change, by analogy to biological evolution. That, however, would be 
associated with excessive waste and failure. The cycle is not inexorable: development may get 
stalled. In particular, after consolidation development may get stuck in inertia. People and 
organisations may be unable to unlearn and to surrender the routines and skills they have developed 
and which are demonstrably efficient. In markets, however, such inertia is vulnerable to new entry 
of entrepreneurs, provided that such entry is allowed. Firms may decline due to inertia or may be 
jolted out of inertia by threats of competition. In the stage of radical innovation, novel combinations 
may get lost in a chaos of competing systems that fail to lead to any dominant design.  
 The process of discovery is often not intentional. Generalisation is generally not driven by 
the will to learn. Psychologists tell us that there is a well-known, instinctive drive of ‘over-
confidence’ to generalize existing competencies to new contexts. This is exhibited, for example, in 
child’s play. In economics it takes the form of an expansionist drive to obtain profit or power from 
applying successful practice to wider contexts. From the perspective of evolutionary psychology 
one might even surmise that we have this instinctive drive because it leads to learning. However, 
the heuristic may be used more intentionally as a learning strategy. That, we suggest, is what we 
now see in the literature on international business.   
The account of generalisation suggested that it entails a voluntary escape from existing 
dominant practice, in an active strategy of expansion. However, the crux is a change in the context 
of application, and this may also arise in different ways. Often, existing firms are more passive, and 
are then confronted with the invasion of novelty. In other words, they do not actively seek a novel 
context of application, but are confronted by the replacement of their familiar context of application 
by a new one. In fact, this contributes to the phenomenon of punctuated equilibrium. While novelty 
was explored ‘outside’ by more entrepreneurial firms, when it breaks through, other firms are 
forced to adapt, which accelerates the break-through. 
An example from recent empirical research (Gilsing 2003) is the development of multi-
media, to realise opportunities to mix media, which were technically enabled by digitalisation and 
were commercially interesting as a result of the Internet. Entrepreneurs, often younger employees, 
within those companies, saw novel opportunities but could not have their ideas accepted, and ‘spun 
off’ into independent entrepreneurial ventures. When the potential of Internet became clearer, 
publishers were forced to start going along, on the pain of losing out.  
 Note that the cycle appears to solve the problem of exploitation and exploration at least in 
part. By applying current competencies in novel contexts we preserve exploitation, needed to 
survive during the process of discovery, while at the same time contributing to exploration: the 
accumulation of motives, opportunities and means for change. A criterion for search is to look for 
novel contexts that are sufficiently close to maintain exploitation and sufficiently distant to offer 
significant novelty. This connects with the trade-off between cognitive distance and proximity 
discussed before. Learning to conduct international collaboration increases absorptive capacity and 
ability to cross cognitive distance, which increases optimal cognitive distance and raises the level of 
innovative performance.  
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 The analysis indicates how multinationals may tackle the problem of integration and multi-
national differentiation, seen as a special case of the problem of exploitation and exploration. The 
move of internationalisation here corresponds with the move of generalisation. By carrying existing 
products or processes into host countries, MNC’s can develop new insights into limits of feasibility 
and profitability, in the novel context, which builds up the motivation for change, and provides 
insights where changes may be needed and what elements from the novel context may help by 
being incorporated into existing practice. The resulting hybrids are often not efficient, but they give 
room for finding out what novelty might yield a new perspective and what elements, in the structure 
of existing practice, limit the full utilisation of their full potential. This then yields a motive and 
directions for more fundamental change in the architecture of practices imported from the home 
country, as a basis for changing those. For companies in host countries, the importation of practices 
from the multinational provides a new niche for them to adapt to.  
 This opportunity and challenge for reciprocal adaptation is blocked by a multinational 
strategy of imposition. On the other hand, deviation from home country practices entails an initial 
lack of efficiency and coherence. As indicated before, this is problematic to the extent that 
economies of scale and the need to preserve systemic integrity of exploitation would entail a large 
sacrifice. What organisational forms are there for combining exploitation and exploration?  
 
INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION 
 
As in the classical innovation cycle, the extended cycle is associated with integration and 
disintegration of organisational forms, i.e. with the strengthening and loosening of linkages of co-
ordination. Generally, exploitation requires fixity, clarity and non-ambiguity of standards (whether 
they be standards for tasks, output or skills), while exploration requires that they be allowed to 
become ambiguous and loose. Generally, after a movement of integration in the process of 
consolidation and generalisation, there is a movement of disintegration, first gradual and later more 
radical, in the stages of differentiation and reciprocation. This is needed to deal with variety of 
information, in the generalisation to different contexts (cf. Chandler 1962, Stinchcombe 1990), and 
to allow for flexibility of differentiation and novel combinations. Disintegration can take several 
forms: decentralisation within the integrated firm, increased autonomy for subsidiaries, outsourcing, 
management buy-outs, spin-offs, sell-offs, external corporate venturing, novel entry of independent 
firms and the formation of industrial networks.  
 In the stage of consolidation, with the search for a dominant design, it is important that 
misfits are efficiently weeded out. As the dominant design emerges, there is a drive for efficient 
exploitation. Competition has shifted from novelty to price. Tacit, procedural knowledge has been 
developed into more declarative, documented knowledge, which allows for wider diffusion. 
Standards allow for disintegration while maintaining fit across interfaces in chains of production. 
Increase of scale is enabled by growth of demand and penetration into extended markets, and is 
necessary to reduce costs due to increasing competition, as patents wear out and imitation increases. 
This favors larger production units, integrated distribution channels, spreading of risks, access to 
finance and the umbrella of a brand name. This favors a larger, more international and more integra-
ted firm.  
 Next, as generalisation turns into differentiation and reciprocation, comparative advantage 
shifts again to greater variety, in more autonomous divisions, subsidiaries or independent firms, to 
give room for the generation of variety by reciprocation, in preparation of the next round of more 
fundamental innovation. Differentiation of products and processes also contributes to an escape from 
pure price competition between identical products that developed from generalisation. Small firms, or 
independent units within large firms, are better at product differentiation in niche markets, where they 
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do not run into disadvantages of small scale and can benefit from flexibility and proximity to 
customers. 
 How, then, can firms combine integration for the sake of exploitation and disintegration for 
the sake of exploration? The part of the organisation that is oriented towards exploitation is oriented 
towards division of labor, co-ordination, standards, stability, preservation of boundaries, efficiency. 
The part that is oriented towards exploration is oriented towards process, autonomy, breaking 
standards, change, crossing boundaries, and novelty. The one sees the other as bureaucratic and non-
entrepreneurial, and is itself seen as erratic, wasteful, disorganised, and inefficient. 
 As discussed before, the problem is more serious when the exploitation system is highly 
systemic, with many elements that are densely connected, with narrow tolerances on their 
interfaces, and is much more easily solved when elements in the system are stand-alone. As a result, 
there is no single way to go about it.  
 An example of a highly stand-alone system is a consultancy company. Here, professionals 
have a large scope for autonomy, and exploitation already entails tailor-made advice that cannot be 
standardised. Efficiency, in standardisation, lies more in the ‘back-office support’ in administration, 
information provision, and training. However, beyond that, even here attempts are made to 
safeguard professional standards and quality. For example, this is needed to ensure consistent 
quality across different locations of a multi-national customer. A problem arises for exploitation. 
Measures must be taken that different consultants make use of each other’s experience in order not 
to re-invent wheels all the time. In some cases (as in the now defunct consultancy firm Arthur 
Andersen, cf. Nooteboom 2000), consultants are encouraged to contribute their experience to a 
common pool, and to work together. This requires incentive systems for consultants to volunteer 
their experience to the common pool. That requires that they be judged and promoted at least in part 
on the basis of such contributions, weighted by their usefulness, measured by the extent that 
colleagues make successful use of them. The common pool would require a certain minimal amount 
of standardisation of concepts and procedures, in a thesaurus. The problem then is that such fixity of 
meanings and categories hampers exploration. Thus, it was necessary to have a committee that 
collected problems in fitting new ideas into the system, and periodically revised the semantic 
system. That still entails a problem of delay, so that radically new ideas could not be diffused 
quickly. Thus, even in this case the problem of exploitation and exploration reared its head.  
 When it is difficult to combine exploration and exploitation in time and place, they need to be 
separated in time or place. With separation in time, exploitation occurs at one time, and exploration at 
another. This yields the ‘oscillating’ (Burns & Stalker 1961), or ‘ambidexterous’ (Duncan 1976) or 
‘two-state’ (Shepard 1967) mode, with a to-and-fro between disintegrated, loose and open to 
integrated, tight and homogeneous, and back again. The question is how people can be so flexible as 
to cope with the resulting uncertainty and instability. In terms of organisational culture, one would 
need regular cultural revolutions. 
 With separation in place, one part of an organisation engages in exploitation, another in 
exploration. There can be horizontal or vertical separation. In horizontal separation one division or 
department, typically R&D, preferably in collaboration with marketing, engages in exploration, and 
another, typically production, engages in exploitation. The problem here is of course how to govern 
the interface. There is the perennial frustration of marketing people that production people are ‘not 
willing’ or ‘blind’ to deliver what market opportunities call for, and the equally perennial frustration 
of production people that marketing people are too dense to appreciate what is technically feasible and 
cost-effective. Vertical separation can go two ways. In one, management yields scope for exploration 
to take place ‘below’, where people interact with the market and with sources of technology, labour, 
inputs, to utilise the opportunities they meet, and management tries to maintain sufficient coherence to 
prevent waste of duplication and mismatch. Alternatively, management lays claim to choices of 
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direction and content, and co-ordinates staff in the execution of their vision. Junior staff is trained in 
exploitation, subject to strict standards of efficient production, and may proceed to more autonomous, 
varied, exploratory work after they prove their ability and mastery of standard work and accumulate 
experience as a basis for it. The disadvantage of this is that senior people may have become too 
committed or entrenched in past or existing concepts, standards and procedures. Another type of 
separation is based on a dual internal labour market. Routinised exploitation is relegated to temporary 
staff, which is hived off when their skills have become redundant or obsolete, if they are unable to 
adjust. An example is massive ‘back-office’ clerical work in administration or simple programming, 
which is typically located in low-wage countries with little job security. Highly skilled ‘core’ workers 
conduct exploration in an ongoing fashion. Similar in logic, though not in structure, is March’s (1991) 
analysis, on the basis of a simulation model, of a dual internal labour market where for any task some 
staff are geared (selected, trained) to conform fast to established practice, and others (the mavericks) 
are selected to maintain and try to impose their own ideas. The problem here lies in the double 
organisational focus involved, for different classes of people, who may then be unable to understand 
and sympathise with each other, yielding lack of trust, whereby exploitation and exploration become 
disconnected.  
 A radical form of separation in place is to drop the ambition of combining exploitation and 
exploration in one firm, and to specialise in one or the other, and seek outside partners with a 
complementary focus. Exploratory firms would need to pass on activities that have reached the 
stage of consolidation to firms specialised in exploitation. The classic example of this is the 
distribution of labour between often small-scale biotechnology firms who conduct exploration, and 
pharmaceutical firms, who conduct exploitation, in the lengthy and scale-intensive procedure of 
gaining regulatory approval of new drugs, spreading risks of failure, producing drugs efficiently, 
and distributing them widely under the umbrella of a brand name.    
 Many organisational scholars have dealt with this theme (e.g. Thompson 1967). In economics 
it was discussed by Aoki (1986), who made a distinction between a horizontal and a vertical 
‘information structure’. In the vertical structure management co-ordinates workshops but is incapable 
of adequate monitoring of emerging events in markets and technologies. In the horizontal structure 
production decisions are co-ordinated among semi-autonomous shops, which can better respond on 
the spot to emerging events. The former is typically American (the ‘A firm’), Aoki proposes, and the 
latter typically Japanese (the ‘J firm’). In the A firm there are clear job specifications, and standard 
operating procedures. Problem solving is relegated to supervisors, repairmen, and engineers. In the J 
firm, duties are not specified in detail, workers rotate across jobs so that they become familiar with a 
wide range of activities, as a basis for horizontal co-ordination. Decentralisation is also carried across 
the boundaries of the firm to suppliers, who are given more scope for initiative.  
 Large, integrated firms can survive or indeed create the discontinuities of novel combinati-
ons by means of decentralization of highly autonomous divisions or even individual ‘intrapreneurs’. 
But there are limits to the variety that can be created and sustained in a large firm. How can one 
foresee the kinds of variety that might become relevant? In the extreme case, to create that variety 
the large firm would have to engage in practically everything, allowing for any combinations, and 
what then remains of the notion of an organisation? It seems necessary to also maintain a readiness 
to mop up successful small innovators, in order to tap into a variety of independent firms that would 
be hard to reproduce within the firm. This is reflected in the finding of Barkema & Vermeulen 
(1998) that firms alternate between internal development and external development by acquiring 
innovative firms.  
 Another inventive combination is the practice at the ‘Central Book House’, in the Netherlands 
(Nooteboom 2000). It buys and supplies books for the book trade. It has three core divisions, which 
need to be tightly integrated: 
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1. the assortment of books, which must offer a high degree of differentiation to customers, in terms of 
composition and size of packages. 
2. logistics for efficient and fast delivery 
3. Information technology to enable 2 and to collect and provide strategically vital information as to 
what books are read by whom, where at what price, for 1 and for customers (both publishers and shop 
keepers). 
 Clearly, efficient exploitation is crucial here. But so is exploration, to keep up with 
developments in reading habits, technologies of information processing and dissemination, and 
changes in publishing. Due to the systemic coherence of the three divisions, innovation must occur 
in step between them. To achieve this while maintaining efficient exploitation, the following 
solution was found. The organisation is basically exploitation oriented. For exploration there is a 
permanent R&D team of ten people, recruited at different moments (two new people every half 
year), from the three different departments, and moving out after two years, not going back to their 
own division of origin but one of the others. Moving out from exploration, back into exploitation 
they carry responsibility for implementing innovations they helped to develop. One can see the 
advantages. One is that exploration is based on experience in exploitation, and is conducted with a 
view to the expected responsibility for implementation to be taken on later. The different divisions 
each contribute both to exploration and its implementation, to protect systemic coherence. There is 
turnover in the team to maintain variety and ongoing influx of experience from exploitation. This is 
a case of combining exploitation and exploration by spatial separation with both horizontal and 
vertical co-ordination. Are there problems? It seems that the assumption in the system is that the 
cycle of innovation is two years. If it turns out to be longer a person moving out of the R&D team 
has nothing new to implement in the division he joins, at least not an innovation to which he 
contributed. Is this an incentive or a disincentive to see to it that something new comes out within 
the two years? What if people are valuable but do not want to move out of exploration and back into 
exploitation, and if their competencies support that preference? What guarantees that one will 
always find people who have the skills and interest in both exploitation and exploration? What 
guarantees are there that rivalries between the divisions will not be carried into the development 
process? Is this really prevented by the prospect of having to move into another division after the 
two years in exploration?  
One might try to escape the problem by not engaging in production in any way, but to act as 
an orchestrator of productive activities of others. ICT increasingly yields the opportunities for this. 
Quinn (1992) gives the example of a company that offers custom-made ASICS (Application Specific 
Integrated Circuits). They interface with clients directly by means of ICT, to determine functional 
specifications. They then employ their own specialised software to convert this into photo masks, 
which are sent by ICT to a company in Japan for etching, next to a company in Korea for dicing and 
mounting, next to Malaysia for assembly, from where the chip is flown directly to the customer. A 
similar example in sports shoes is Nike. Another example is Benetton: it also performs the task of 
orchestration, by means of ICT, of a decentralised network of individual producers and retailers.  
However, rather than refuting the cycle of innovation, these examples show how the orchestrator 
conducts exploration by flexibly exploiting the productive competencies of different companies, in 
shifting configurations, and thereby tries to escape the need and the dangers of inertia. The risk of 
inertia due to standardized, more or less fixed systems for efficient production is hived off to other 
players. But even here, the focal, orchestrating firm must be careful to both maintain and develop 
his core competency of orchestration. 
 In the present context of international business, the main point here is that the problem of 
how to reconcile (multinational) diversity with the need for some integration is not a new problem. 
The problem is known more widely as the problem of exploitation and exploration, firms have to deal 
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with it regardless of internationalisation, and there are insights in options for organisational structures 
to deal with the problem. The forms of organisations discussed here may be applied or modified to 
deal with the problem of multinational diversity.  If in order to profit from learning opportunities 
emerging from the host country context a subsidiary enters into conflict with the order of global 
exploitation, it might be set aside, at least in part of its activities, in a similar way that one may set 
aside a development group in the home country.  One may also hive off a subsidiary, in an alliance 
relationship, where it is given the role of exploration outside of the order of exploitation, in a similar 
way that in the home country one might engage in such a relationship with an outside specialised 
supplier or developer.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This article analyses the problem of how to combine multinational diversity with integration for the 
sake of efficiency as a special case of the general problem of how to combine exploitation and 
exploration, and develops several hypotheses for further empirical testing. 
In its theoretical analysis, the article offers the following insights: 
- It gives additional arguments for the permanence of distinctive features of business systems. 
- However, it also develops an argument how multinational diversity may yield radical 
innovation from outside, which may shift home country institutional arrangements and 
perhaps also the wider institutional environment. For this, it employs a ‘heuristic’ or ‘cycle’ 
of discovery, in which the process of internationalisation is seen as a process of 
generalisation, which, via differentiation and reciprocation, in a process of ‘allopatric 
speciation’, yields ‘punctuated equilibria’.  
The different conditions of host countries may serve to find limitations to home country 
products and practices, which leads to differentiation, and to discover potential new elements of 
products and practices, in experimentation with novel, hybrid combinations of home and host 
country elements, in exploration. When this yields insight in promising new avenues, it may also 
yield insight into where existing home country principles block the full utilisation of novelty. This, 
then, yields a rational basis for changing them, in enabling the management of a subsidiary to 
demonstrate proven potential that would make pervasive change across the multinational worth-
while, beyond the boundaries of the host country where the insights were developed.  
- While such discovery is often an unintended by-product of internationalisation, MNC’s may 
adopt it as a deliberate learning strategy.  
- The familiar phenomenon, in the alliance literature, that often collaboration starts with a 
joint venture, which later is taken over by one of the partners may be explained as follows. 
If a partnership sets out for exploration, this requires a disintegrated structure, as in a joint 
venture, and when outcomes reach the stage of exploitation there is need for integration.   
The article offers the following insights for the management of MNC’s: 
- The notion of organisational ‘focus’, in connection with Mintzberg’s forms of coordination, 
may contribute to answering the question how to coordinate international activities, taking 
into account their implications for the scope for local adaptations, in a learning strategy. 
This is likely to require a longer-term strategic orientation, in which some home countries 
(Japan, Germany) have an advantage over others (US, UK). Such home country differences may 
lead to different styles of multinationalisation, which may perpetuate home country differences. If 
globalisation of capital markets imposes a short-term perspective, this is likely to be 
counterproductive for a learning strategy, and this gives a good reason to try and prevent such 
development, or to extricate oneself from it.  
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- There is considerable insight into alternative forms of organisation to deal with the problem 
of combining integration and disintegration that may result from the problem of exploitation 
and exploration, and these may inform modes of international management.  
To the extent that the exploitation system is stand-alone, it is not too difficult to combine 
exploration and exploitation. This article used the example of a consultancy firm, where the very 
activity of exploitation (highly autonomous consultants giving tailor-made advice) is already highly 
exploratory. Here, one may need to stimulate exploitation by sharing new practices and methods, by 
use of technical IT-based systems for sharing, with requisite incentives, or by rotating personnel 
across teams, countries or fields of consultancy. When the exploitation system is highly systemic, 
and deviations from it, in experimentation, would jeopardise systemic integrity, as for example in 
an oil company, one would need to allow for separate niches for experimentation with novel 
combinations to take place. Which is the case depends on the nature of the product and 
corresponding technology and organisation. Some activities of a multinational may be more 
systemic and others more stand-alone, so that one may need to resort to a mixed mode of 
organisation. Thus, there is no single, universal best way to run a multinational.  
When the exploitation system is highly systemic, one may try to make it more decomposable by 
modularisation, or by developing a more flexible technology. When that is not feasible, one may 
resort to spin-outs, where experimentation is set aside in a separate niche within the organisation, or 
spin-offs into independent ventures, in ‘external corporate venturing’, possibly in the form of joint 
ventures with local partners, with the option of ‘spinning in’ again when success is manifested and 
re-integration appears to be worth while, for exploitation.  
One may consider other ways of separating exploitation and exploration in place or time, 
indicated in this article. One might see subsidiaries as laboratories for exploration, with the central 
task of head-office to collect the results into feasible configurations of exploitation. If subsidiaries 
are highly focused on exploitation, one might consider a solution analogous to the solution found by 
the ‘Central Book House’, discussed in this article, with a permanent development group with 
rotating membership from a variety of host countries, to conduct exploration, with participants 
moving back into subsidiaries, but not the same they came from. In analogy to the dual structure of 
exploration and exploitation in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, one might go for specialisation 
in one activity, and engage in alliances with firms that specialise in the other. One might go for 
‘orchestration’, discussed in this article, where a multinational does not engage in any production, 
and focuses on exploration, in an ongoing re-reconfiguration of activities of design and production 
across a range of countries. 
The article offers the following hypotheses for further empirical testing:  
- Cultural distance may yield not only a problem but also an opportunity, in an inverted-U 
shaped relation between such distance and innovative performance. 
- The usefulness of longevity of international collaboration is limited, with an inverted-U 
shaped relation between longevity and innovative performance. 
- Different styles of internationalisation, as a result of home-country effects, may be 
interpreted as different approaches to the issue of exploitation and exploration.  
Child et. al. (2001) noted that in some cases (US and Japanese parent companies) home country 
styles of management were carried forward into FDI by acquisitions in the UK. US companies 
tended to take a short-term profit perspective, and to engage in high levels of integration of 
companies acquired in the UK, with a high degree of ‘imposition’ of both strategic and operational 
control. Japanese parent companies took a more long-term growth perspective, engaged in less 
integration, and allowed for more local autonomy, limited strategic control, and involvement in 
operational matters on an advisory basis. According to the present analysis, the latter, Japanese 
approach would allow for more innovation from absorption of local practices (differentiation and 
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reciprocation) than the former. Child et. al. analyzed effects on performance only in terms of profit 
and sales growth. For our present purpose, we would need to look at innovative performance. The 
conduct with respect to UK acquisitions of French and German parent companies was not so clearly 
consonant with their home-country styles of management. In fact, in their UK acquisitions, French 
parent companies did not hold on to their home country inclination towards deep hierarchies, and 
within boundaries of strong high-level strategic control, they allowed for considerable local 
autonomy, and hardly engaged in operational control. German companies engaged only in little 
integration, as well as little strategic and operational control. They were much less formal in 
procedures of planning and control than in their home country. As one possible explanation, Child 
et. al. hypothesized that with lesser experience one is less self-confident and hence less inclined 
towards a strategy of imposition. However, from the present analysis one might expect that if the 
hypothesis of innovation by internationalization is valid, more experienced companies, having 
caught on to the principle, would go for lesser imposition. Did the French and German companies 
perhaps loosen their home country style for this reason? A follow-up question would be whether 
from their experience with foreign acquisitions MNC’s have changed their home-country styles of 
management. This type of analysis, as conducted by Child et.al., is complicated by a number of 
factors. As noted above, exploration requires looser, more decentralized organisational structures, 
while exploitation requires more integrated structures. If one takes a short-term profit perspective, 
this suggests a focus on exploitation, and for that a strategy of imposition, to achieve economies of 
scale and standardisation, would in general be the preferred mode. Child et. al. did find that the US 
parents, with their more short term profit motive, engaging in a strategy of imposition, did achieve 
higher profits. The Japanese parents, with their longer-term growth motive, engaging more in a 
strategy of local adaptation, did achieve higher growth. Again, we would need to test whether the 
US strategy yielded less radical innovation, and the Japanese strategy more, as the present analysis 
would predict. 
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